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COVID-19 conspiracy theories have proliferated during the global pandemic, and their rapid
spread among certain groups may jeopardize the public health response (e.g., undermining
motivation to engage in social distancing and willingness to vaccinate against the virus). Using
survey data from two waves of a nationally representative, longitudinal study of life in lockdown in
the United Kingdom (N  1,406), we analyze the factors associated with belief in three origin
theories related to COVID-19, namely that it 1) originated in a meat market in Wuhan, China; 2)
was developed in a lab in Wuhan, China; and 3) is caused by 5G mobile networks. Our findings
suggest that political-psychological predispositions are strongly associated with belief in
conspiracy theories about the virus, though the direction and effect sizes of these predictors
vary dependingon the specific content of eachorigin theory. For instance, belief in theChinese lab
conspiracy theory is strongly associatedwith right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance
orientation (SDO), and general conspiracy ideation, as well as less reliable news sources, distrust
in scientists, and anxiety about the pandemic. Belief in the 5G network conspiracy theory is
strongly associated with SDO, distrust in scientists, while less strongly with conspiracy ideation
and information from social networks/media; RWA is strongly negatively associated with belief in
the 5G conspiracy theory, with older and more wealthy individuals somewhat less likely to
endorse it. The meat market origin theory is predicted by intolerance of uncertainty,
ethnocentrism, COVID-19 anxiety, and less so by higher income, while distrust in scientists is
negatively associated with this origin story. Finally, belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories is
associated with negative public health behaviors such as unwillingness to social distance and
vaccinate against the virus. Crucially, our findings suggest that the specific content of COVID-19
conspiracy theories likely determines which individuals may be most likely to endorse them.
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It is virtually not assimilable to our reason that a small lonely man
felled a giant in the midst of his limousines, his legions, his throng,
and his security. If such a nonentity destroyed the leader of the
most powerful nation on earth, then a world of disproportion
engulfs us, and we live in a universe that is absurd.
- From Oswald's Tale: An American Mystery by Norman
Mailer, on the public’s obsession with conspiracy theories about
the assassination of John F. Kennedy Christmas cancelled. Thank
you, China.- Nigel Farage, Twitter, December 2020
INTRODUCTION
Major world events are known to spawn conspiracy theories.
This may be due, at least in part, to proportionality intuitions
that render mundane explanations for important events
inadequate and unsatisfying (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007;
Douglas et al., 2019). Thus, the notion that Princess Diana
died because her driver was drunk, or that John F. Kennedy
was felled by a lone gunman, threatens to engulf us in Norman
Mailer’s “world of disproportion.”
Likewise, the COVID-19 pandemic is an event of immense
global significance. The pandemic has occasioned massive
social and economic upheaval, including nationwide
lockdowns, school closures, the postponement or
cancellation of major public events, and the largest global
recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the time
of writing, the pandemic is already responsible for millions of
deaths worldwide.
As with Kennedy’s assassination, the COVID-19 pandemic
has proven to be fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Some
theories, for example, deny the existence of the virus or downplay
its severity altogether. Such theories may attribute COVID-19
“propaganda” to assumed nefarious actors such as the
United States government (and its plans to link passports with
vaccination records as a means of totalitarian control; Rischel,
2020, March 24) or to the purported vested interests of Bill Gates
and the World Health Organization (McGreal, 2020, May 14).
Yet, as Nigel Farage’s blithe tweet illustrates, a number of
COVID-19 origin theories are intended to stoke hostility
toward foreigners and foreign interests, which comports with
the first reported cases in Wuhan, China. Examples include
origin theories that posit the virus was engineered by the
Chinese government, either in a laboratory as a biological
weapon or with the introduction of 5G mobile technology
(i.e., ostensibly causing the virus through radiation for which
COVID-19 is merely a cover-up; Henley and McIntyre, 2020,
October 26; Ahmed et al., 2020; Bruns et al., 2020). While such
theories may satiate the need for narrative order among those
individuals prone to conspiratorial thinking, they are also
animated by intergroup dynamics of conflict and threat. In
fact, recent studies on COVID-19 conspiracy theories have
demonstrated that predispositions like party identification
and ideology are associated with belief in such theories above
and beyond a general conspiratorial mentality, though
admittedly these reported effects may be context dependent
(e.g., Uscinski et al., 2020).
Here we analyze the factors associated with belief in three
theories regarding the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
at the time of data collection (April 2020) were most prominent:
1) that it originated in a meat market in China (a theory widely
held in the early days of the pandemic but now contested); 2) that
it originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China; and 3) that it was
caused by the rollout of the 5G mobile network. In the study, we
consider the Wuhan laboratory and 5G theories as classic
conspiracy theories, which we will explain in subsequent
sections, while the meat market origin story serves as a
baseline because it falls short of the core definition of a
conspiracy theory.
Using data from two waves of a nationally representative,
longitudinal dataset collected during the United Kingdom
lockdown in 2020 (N  1,406), we analyze several potential
factors that may explain belief in COVID-19 origin theories.
In particular, we focus on interplay between the specific content
of each theory and the political-psychological predispositions that
motivate its belief. We also control for several other socio-
demographic factors, as well as political orientation,
information sources about the pandemic, distrust in scientists,
and COVID-19 anxiety, all of which may impact support for
conspiracy theories. Our results suggest that political-
psychological predispositions such as right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation
(SDO) are statistically significant and substantively interesting
predictors of belief in various COVID-19 origin stories.
Moreover, and in contrast to previous research, the effects of
these latent predispositions are distinct from and sometimes
larger than that of an underlying conspiracy mentality,
depending on the content of the specific conspiracy theory in
question. Finally, we show that belief in conspiracy theories is
associated with certain negative public health attitudes, for
example, predicting motivations to violate social distancing
guidelines and the unwillingness to vaccinate against COVID-19.
In the sections that follow, we address two research questions:
What political-psychological predispositions predict belief in
unsubstantiated COVID-19 origin theories? And what
implications do these conspiracy beliefs have for health-related
behaviors? We contribute to the literature by positing a
motivational model of belief in COVID-19 origin theories (see
alsoMiller et al., 2016; Douglas et al., 2017), in which we argue the
importance of political-psychological predispositions as
motivational factors in explaining susceptibility to belief in
conspiracy theories, as well as their behavioral consequences.
THEORY
Belief in (COVID-19) Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theories are unsubstantiated explanations of major
events with a twist -- that powerful and malevolent actors are
involved in secret plots for their own benefit to the detriment of
the common good (Goertzel, 1994; Uscinski and Parent, 2014).
They generally consist of complex storylines that are hidden from
public scrutiny, thus making them especially resistant to
falsification (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Most importantly,
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conspiracy theories function to protect entrenched beliefs by
discounting contrary evidence as the product of a conspiracy
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Indeed, some conspiracy theories
predict such contrary evidence, evincing what Boudry (2020) calls
a “warped epistemology.” Hence, conspiracy theories may even
serve a valuable purpose for individuals by allowing them to
maintain certain beliefs in the presence of contradictory evidence
(Douglas et al., 2017).
A striking finding in the literature on conspiracy theories, however,
is that belief in one conspiracy theory tends to predict belief in others
(Goertzel, 1994). This is not epistemically problematic when
conspiracy theories are mutually consistent or reinforcing. Yet,
studies have found that even flagrantly contradictory conspiracy
theories are positively correlated in endorsement. For example,
Wood et al. (2012) reported that participants who believed
Princess Diana faked her own death were also more likely to
believe she was murdered. Such findings imply that conspiracist
ideation is driven by a conspiratorial worldview, perhaps
characterized by higher-level rejection of official explanations
(Franks et al., 2017). Indeed, the tendency to believe in conspiracy
theories is associatedwith narcissism (Cichocka et al., 2016), and those
highly disposed to believe in conspiracy theories are especially likely to
endorse theories which they think are only believed by a minority
(Imhoff and Lamberty, 2017).
Yet, conspiracy thinking may also confer a sense of control during
periods of perceived uncertainty or threat (Sullivan et al., 2010;
Uscinski et al., 2017). Miller (2020), for example, has recently
amassed evidence for the “monological belief system” conception
of conspiracy theories (e.g., see Goertzel, 1994) in the context of
COVID-19, finding that contradictory COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs
are positively related in endorsement, though this findingwas partially
explained by personal uncertainty (i.e., the more uncertain people
were about themselves, the world, and the future, the more
intercorrelated their evaluations of conspiracy theories). This adds
to previouswork demonstrating that people aremore likely to endorse
conspiracy theories when conditions of uncertainty and stress are
salient (van Prooijen and Jostmann, 2013; Swami et al., 2016), and that
intolerance of this uncertainty is related to a tendency to seek
simplifying explanations often involving external and threatening
agents (Darwin et al., 2011). Given the uncertainty caused by the
global pandemic, it is perhaps unsurprizing that people may grasp
onto conspiracy theories as a security blanket.
In line with the theory of monological belief systems--that
there is a general conspiracist mentality underpinning belief in specific
conspiracy theories--we hypothesize that endorsement of one specific
theory will be positively associated with belief in others (Hypothesis 1a);
and that conspiracist ideation will be associated with belief in specific
COVID-19 origin theories (Hypothesis 1b).However, these associations
may be limited in helping us understand the diversity in conspiracy
belief during the pandemic. Thus, in the sections that follow,we propose
a motivational model of belief in various COVID-19 origin theories.
AMotivational Model of Belief in Conspiracy
Theories
Research onmotivated reasoning suggests that individuals are biased
information processors, who seek out and accept information that
conforms to their existing predispositions, while expending
considerable effort to discount that which challenges strongly
held priors (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Kahan, 2012). For example,
Tappin et al. (2017) reported evidence of desirability bias in the
context of the 2016 United States election campaign: Individuals
presented with polling evidence about the anticipated election
outcome updated their beliefs more if the evidence was consistent
(vs. inconsistent) with their preferred result. Similarly, Hartman and
Newmark (2012) found that Republicans and ideological
conservatives were especially predisposed to believe negative
rumors about former President Barack Obama because of their
different party identification and strong dislike of him.
We argue that two important political-psychological
predispositions that may be associated with belief in COVID-19
origin theories are right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social
dominance orientation (SDO). Both RWA and SDO emerged from
research investigating different individual-level factors that explain
prejudice and are thought to represent two types of right-wing
personalities (Altemeyer, 1981; Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995; Duckitt,
2001; Sibley et al., 2006;Wilson and Sibley, 2013). In the Dual Process
Motivational Model, for example, Duckitt (2001) theorized that two
sets of motivational schemas, threat-control and competition-
dominance, are the foundations of RWA and SDO, respectively,
and that these dimensions were responsible for distinct forms of
prejudice. For instance, while RWA and SDO both predict prejudice
toward lower status groups, RWA-based prejudice typically
categorizes outgroups as dangerous as threatening to the security
and safety of the ingroup or dissident as representing a symbolic threat
to social norms and cohesion (Shaffer and Duckitt, 2013; Kauff et al.,
2015; Crowson and Brandes, 2017; Faragó et al., 2019). Conversely,
SDO-based prejudice typically categorizes outgroups as inferior, weak,
or undeserving (Duckitt, 2001; Ho et al., 2015).
However, the exact relationships that RWA and SDO have
with conspiracy belief remains unclear. In the development of the
Conspiracy Mentality Scale, for example, Imhoff and Bruder
(2014) note the importance of recognizing the distinction
between prejudice toward lower status groups (e.g., minority
ethnic or religious groups), which is associated with RWA and
SDO, and prejudice toward higher status groups (e.g., the
wealthy), which is not associated with RWA and SDO. Yet,
conspiracy mentality is generally related to prejudice against
high-status and powerful groups or members of society, which
are perceived as less likable and more threatening compared to
low-status and weaker groups (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). A
consistent finding in the literature, then, is that conspiracy
mentality predicts belief in conspiracy theories more strongly
than RWA and SDO (Dyrendal et al., 2021).
In contrast, Richey (2017) presented an alternative theory in which
those with authoritarian personalities are more likely to support
conspiracy beliefs due to higher levels of anxiety and difficulty with
higher order thinking, which has recently been supported bywork that
presents a positive association between conspiracy mentality and
RWA, SDO and political conservatism (van der Linden et al.,
2020; Dyrendal et al., 2021). Yet, Richey’s work focused exclusively
on birtherism (i.e., that former United States President Obama is not
an American citizen) and trutherism (i.e., that former United States
President Bush and the Republican Party knew of 9/11 prior to the
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attack). Nor did it control for SDO,which has been found elsewhere to
predict scores on the General Conspiracist Belief scale, along with
anxious attachment, interpersonal trust, and a Manichean world view
(Green and Douglas, 2018).
Noting the divergent findings on the ability of predispositions
to predict conspiracy belief, Wood and Gray (2019) highlight that
psychologists tend to treat conspiracies as a unitary construct
rather than engaging with the specific content of different
conspiracy theories. They note that some conspiracy theories
reinforce the RWA-associated view that the world is a threatening
place, but that others present a view of the world that is
incompatible with RWA, in which authority figures are
corrupt, and leaders and traditions are social control
mechanisms that must be resisted. In their findings, for
example, RWA was positively associated with pro-
establishment conspiracy beliefs but was uncorrelated with
anti-establishment conspiracy beliefs (i.e., those suggesting that
powerful groups are conspiring to restrict individual freedoms).
Anti-establishment beliefs were moderately positively correlated
with SDO. Wood and Gray (2019) speculate that a dislike of the
deviant groups behind anti-establishment conspiracies, which
present a material threat to social order, could partly explain
the lack of association for RWA. Thus, the model proposes that
RWA predicts a susceptibility to a belief in certain conspiracies
that are compatible with the individual’s existing worldview.
As discussed above, both RWA and SDO are associated with
heightened sensitivity to certain types of threat (Duckitt, 2001;
Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; Stenner, 2005; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt
and Sibley, 2009; Duckitt and Sibley, 2010). Those high in RWA,
which is motivated by a belief that the world is an inherently
threatening place, are particularly sensitive to threats posed by
dangerous or dissident outgroups, while those high in SDO are
particularly sensitive to the threat of competition from outgroups
that challenge societal hierarchies or the dominance of the
ingroup. Of the three explanations for the origin of the
coronavirus examined in the present paper, it seems likely that
people high in RWA would find the theory that the coronavirus
was a bioweapon developed by China’s military as inherently
threatening. In this theory, China’s proliferation of bioweapons
presents an external danger in the form of a security threat from a
potentially hostile political rival, and a social threat in the form of
a deviant or dissident political ideology, communism, to which
people high in RWA are sensitive (Kauff et al., 2015; Crowson and
Brandes, 2017; Faragó et al., 2019). It is also feasible that those
high in SDO would be sensitive to the competitive threat this
theory poses. In the bioweapon origin theory, an international
competitor is trying to gain a military advantage that might
threaten international hierarchies and challenge Britain’s ability
to leverage military power in the international arena, which is
compatible with the underlying “competitive jungle” worldview
of SDO.Moreover, the bioweapon theory presents a situation that
could be used to justify more aggressive foreign policy positions
or increased militarization in the United Kingdom. RWA and
SDO are both associated with nationalism, support for aggressive
foreign policy, and military action (Pratto et al., 1994; Doty et al.,
1997; McFarland and Mathews, 2005; Terrizzi and Drews, 2005;
Crowson et al., 2006; Jackson and Gaaertner, 2010; McFarland,
2015; Lindén et al., 2018). Therefore, we expect that RWA and
SDO will be positively associated with belief in the Chinese lab
origin story (Hypothesis 2).
Conversely, the links between predispositions and the 5G
origin theory appear less clear cut. While the 5G origin theory
taps into a potential security threat, the development of 5G
technology in the United Kingdom had the support of the
TABLE 1 | Sample demographics (n  1,406) benchmarked against British Election Study (BES) Wave 19 (n  32,177).
Variable Category Proportion Bes W19 proportion







Gender Male 0.517 0.468
Female 0.481 0.532
Other/Prefer not to say 0.002 —
Ethnicity White 0.930 0.942
Ethnic minorities (excluding white minorities) 0.070 0.044
Prefer not to say — 0.010
NA — 0.005
Education Other qualification or no qualifications 0.556 0.684
Degree education 0.444 0.316
Gross household income Study categories BES W19 categories —
£0–15,490 £0–£14,999 0.198 0.184
£15,491–£25,340 £15,000–£24,999 0.179 0.206
£25,341–£38,740 £25,000–£39,999 0.184 0.264
£38,741–£57,930 £40,000–£59,999 0.221 0.186
£57,931 or more £60,000 or more 0.217 0.159
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government, and therefore is less compatible with an RWA
worldview that would be largely pro-establishment. Rather, the
various forms of 5G origin theories are often linked to the virus
via somewhat convoluted and contradictory mechanisms, some
of which claim the virus is real but caused by 5G, and some of
which claim it is a hoax altogether (Sturm and Albrecht, 2020).
One such conspiracy claims that COVID-19 is a pretense to
cover-up to the negative health effects of 5G radiation established
by those profiteering from the technology (Bruns et al., 2020).
Such a claim is consistent with theory that predicts people high in
SDO may be more likely to perceive dishonesty as an accepted
norm in a highly competitive world, in which people do whatever
is necessary to succeed (De keersmaeker and Roets, 2019), and is
supported by evidence from a UK sample showing a positive
association between SDO and belief COVID-19 is a hoax (Imhoff
and Lamberty, 2020). A consistent theme running through the
proliferation of 5G conspiracy theories has been their
mobilization by partisan groups, in particular their
assimilation into and conjoining with pre-existing conspiracies
frequently espoused in far-right networks (Bruns et al., 2020).
SDO has been found to positively predict identification with far
right groups, and subsequent intent to engage in extreme and
violent actions toward outgroups, providing a justification for
beliefs and actions that benefit the ingroup (Bai, 2020). Relatedly,
§) has argued that motivation to believe in conspiracy theories is
greater when they are related to a salient group identity such as
the far right. Therefore, given the proliferation of 5G conspiracies
through far-right networks, the extremity of the intent and
actions associated with it (e.g., the burning of 5G towers;
Jolley and Paterson, 2020), and the consistency of its content
that sees the world as competitive and actors as self-interested, we
predict SDO will be positively associated with the 5G origin
theory (Hypothesis 3).
Yet, we have no strong expectations regarding the association
between RWA and 5G belief, and similarly no strong expectations
regarding RWA and SDO and belief in the Chinese meat market
theory. Our reasoning is that the former does not tap into threats
to the social order or status of the ingroup, while the latter is not
really a conspiracy theory (i.e., it does not involve intentional
actions by a powerful and malevolent group).
Public Health Implications
Finally, endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories may
affect critical public health issues such as adherence to social
distancing rules and attitudes toward vaccination. Experimental
evidence suggests exposure to conspiracy theories reduces the
intent to engage in health-promoting behaviors, such as visiting a
doctor, and that the relationship is mediated by decreased trust in
health professionals (Natoli and Marques, 2020). More recently,
conspiracy mentality has been shown to reduce willingness to
comply with preventative COVID-19 measures, such as national
lockdowns, where they are mandated by governments or
authority figures (Marinthe et al., 2020).
Again there is evidence that the content of a conspiracy theory
matters for subsequent behavior. For instance, Imhoff and
Lamberty (2020) report that claiming the virus was a hoax
reduced compliance with social distancing but claiming the
virus was man-made had no effect. In this vein, social
distancing motivations may be undermined if the severity of
the virus is understated or if the scientific consensus on human-
to-human transmission is questioned, as insinuated by claims it is
caused by 5G radiation or that the pandemic lockdowns were
only a pretense for the cover-up and/or rollout of 5G networks
(Bruns et al., 2020). Similarly, a number of conspiracy theories
make unfounded claims regarding the supposed dangers of
vaccines (Sturm and Albrecht, 2020). Indeed, social network
analysis of the spread of COVID-19 conspiracies details the
prominence of a conspiracy theory which overlaps across
those origin theories tested in this study, suggesting the virus
was engineered in China, but that its full effects will be realized via
a vaccine that is activated by 5G (Bruns et al., 2020: 19).
Thus, given the negative effect of conspiracy belief on health
promoting behaviors, and their potentially corrosive effect on
trust in medical interventions and the consensus on human
transmission, we expect belief in our set of conspiracies to be
negatively associated with social distancing motivations




The data for this study come from a nationally representative
longitudinal survey of adults living in the United Kingdom
during the early phases of the COVID-19 global pandemic.
Participants were recruited by Qualtrics from March 23rd to
28th, 2020 (Wave 1: N  2,025), and were recontacted from
April 22nd to May 1st, 2020 (Wave 2: n  1,406, recontact rate 
69%). Data for Wave 1 of the survey occurred during the first
week of the strict national lockdown in the United Kingdom,
while follow-up data for Wave 2 was collected approximately
1 month later during the lockdown and 3 months after the first
confirmed COVID-19 case there, which saw rapidly increasing
infections. These data comprise part of a longitudinal, multi-
country study that aims to assess the psychological, social,
economic, and political impact of the COVID-19 virus in the
general population (McBride et al., 2020).
Although the sample was drawn from non-probability
methods, research suggests that Qualtrics approximates
probability-based samples reasonably well when quotas are
used (Zack et al., 2019). Thus, we employed stratified quota
sampling matched against known demographics in terms of age,
gender, and household income within the United Kingdom. We
also present a summary Table 1 of demographics benchmarked
againstWave 19 of the British Election Study, which was collected
using similar survey methods. McBride et al. (2020) provide a
more detailed description of the panel recruitment, sampling
methodology (including post-stratification weights and analysis
of panel attrition), and explanation of all measures administered
in the study. The full panel dataset will be deposited to the
United Kingdom Data Archive and Open Science Framework
approximately six months after data collection for the project has
been completed.
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Dependent Variables
To assist interpretation and comparison of effect sizes, we
rescaled all of the continuous variables described below to
range from zero to one. Descriptive statistics for all measures
included in our analyses are available in Table 2, which also
details the study wave in which they were collected.
Theories About the Origin of COVID-19
Respondents indicated the degree to which they believed various
COVID-19 origin stories using a slider scale ranging from 0 to 100.
This yielded three outcomes concerning belief in the following:
1. “COVID-19 originated in a meat market in Wuhan,
China” (M  0.64, SD  0.29);
2. “COVID-19 was developed in a lab in Wuhan, China”
(M  0.38, SD  0.33);
3. “5Gmobile networks are responsible for the current global
pandemic” (M  0.11, SD  0.22).
The distributions for these three origin stories are displayed in
Figure 1. Prior to data collection, we reviewed a number of potential
conspiracy theories regarding COVID-19 (e.g., see Lynas, 2020, April
20). We selected these three origin theories because they varied along
two theoretically interesting dimensions: 1) the degree to which they
might be defined as conspiracy theories (low to high), and 2) the
nature of the threat that they imply. For instance, the Wuhan lab
origin theory is arguably the most conventional conspiracy theory
according to the definition we have outlined above, implicating
powerful actors in a malevolent plot. In contrast, the meat market
origin story is hardly a full-blown conspiracy theory because it was not
created by a cabal of powerful people with selfish intentions.1 And
finally, the 5G theory is a conspiracy theory, but differs from the
Wuhan laboratory theory in terms of the nature of the implied threat:
Where the laboratory theory implicates a foreignmilitary power and is
framed as a potential matter of national security, the 5G theory is an
anti-establishment conspiracy concerned with a coalition of powerful
corporate, technological and government actors. This variation allows
us to analyze the common drivers of belief in COVID-19 conspiracies,
and to compare these to the factors related tomoremainstreambeliefs,
but also how a differential sense of threat from a conspiracy theory
produces diversity in subsequent propagation and behaviors.
Motivation to Engage in Social Distancing
Four items from the Capability, Opportunity, Motivation-
Behaviour (COM-B) model of behavior change (Michie et al.,
2011) were used to assess respondents’ motivation to engage in
social distancing behaviors (M  0.82, SD  0.19, alpha  0.87).
Willingness to Take a COVID-19 Vaccine
Respondents were asked “If a new vaccine were to be developed
that could prevent COVID-19, would you accept it?” Three
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of key measures.
Variable Mean SD Wave Description
Dependent variables
Meat market belief 0.64 0.29 2 Slider scale from 0 to 100, scaled 0–1
Wuhan lab belief 0.38 0.33 2 Slider scale from 0 to 100, scaled 0–1
5G belief 0.11 0.22 2 Slider scale from 0 to 100, scaled 0–1
Motivation to engage in social
distancing
0.82 0.19 2 4-Item subscale of reflective motivation from the COM-B model, alpha  0.87, scaled 0–1
Willingness to accept a vaccine — — 2 Willingness to accept a hypothetical COVID-19 vaccine for themselves? Willing: 67.6% (“yes”); reluctant:
32.4% (“May be”  23.4%, “No”  9.1%)
Independent variables
Conspiracy ideation 0.57 0.2 1 5-Item conspiracy mentality scale, alpha  0.85, scaled 0–1
RWA 0.51 0.17 1 6-Item very short Authoritarianism scale, alpha  0.68, scaled 0–1
SDO 0.36 0.18 1 8-Item SDO7 scale, alpha  0.84, scaled 0–1
Left-right scale 0.49 0.2 1 Self-reported placement on a political scale, ranging from 1 (left) - 10 (right), scaled 0–1
Ethnocentrism 0.57 0.25 2 2-Item scale, alpha  0.82, scaled 0–1
Distrust of scientists 0.34 0.25 2 Ordinal degree of distrust in scientists, scaled 0–1
COVID-19 anxiety 0.61 0.26 2 Slider scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely anxious), scaled 0–1
Intolerance of uncertainty 0.49 0.2 2 12-Item scale, alpha  0.91, scaled 0–1
News consumption: Elite 0.38 0.48 2 Dummy for those who read “elite-level” newspapers (yes  1; none  0)
News consumption: Mid-level 0.32 0.47 2 Dummy for those who read “mid-level” newspapers (yes  1; none  0)
News consumption: Tabloid 0.27 0.44 2 Dummy for those who read tabloid newspapers (yes  1; none  0)
Information from family and friends 0.38 0.28 2 Ordinal measure of extent of COVID-19 information received from family and friends, scaled 0–1
Information from social media 0.3 0.32 2 Ordinal measure of extent of COVID-19 information received from social media, scaled 0–1
Age 0.45 0.21 2 Continuous variable, scaled 0–1
Gender 0.48 0.5 2 Dummy variable (female  1)
Income 0.52 0.36 1 Ordinal gross income bands (2019), scaled 0–1
Education 0.44 0.5 1 Dummy for university education (Bachelor’s degree or higher  1)
1Indeed it is worth noting that due to the ongoing investigations into the origin of
the virus, what is considered a conspiracy with regards to its origins is to a degree
dependent upon time and context. At the time of writing the World Health
Organization have explored both the weapons laboratory and meat market
hypotheses; however, it is thought that neither origin theory is likely.
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response options were available: Yes (n  939, 67.6%), No (n 
126, 9.1%), and Maybe (n  325, 23.4%).
Independent Variables
As with the outcomes above, we rescaled all continuous predictors to
range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation and comparison of effect sizes.
Conspiracy Ideation
Conspiracy mentality (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014) was measured
using five items (scored on an 11-point scale from 1 “Certainly
not 0%” to 11 “Certainly 100%”), including: “I think that many
very important things happen in the world, which the public is
never informed about”; and “I think that events which
superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of
secret activities” (M  0.57, SD  0.20, alpha  0.85).
Right-Wing Authoritarianism
The 6-item Very Short Authoritarianism scale (Bizumic and
Duckitt, 2018) was used to assess respondents’ levels of
authoritarianism. Participants indicated the extent to which
they agreed with statements (on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”) such as follows:
“It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy
authority”; “What our country needs most is discipline, with
everyone following our leaders in unity”; and “Our society does
NOT need tougher government and stricter laws” (M  0.51, SD 
0.17, alpha  0.68).
Social Dominance Orientation
Respondents’ levels of social dominance orientation were assessed
using the 8-item social dominance orientation scale (SDO-7; Ho et al.,
2015). Respondents were asked the extent to which they favored
statements (on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Strongly
oppose” to 5 “Strongly favor”) such as the following: “An ideal
society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the
bottom”; “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”;
and “We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different
groups” (M  0.36, SD  0.18, alpha  0.84).
Political Orientation
One question (adapted from the British Election Study 2017)
asked respondents how they would describe their political
affiliation on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “left-wing” to
10 “right-wing” (M  0.49, SD  0.20).
Ethnocentrism
Two items to measure ethnocentrism were adapted from
Davidov (2011): “The world would be a better place if
people from other countries were more like the British”
and “Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than
most other countries”. Responses were scored on 5-point
Likert scales from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly
agree” (M  0.57, SD  0.25, alpha  0.82).
Distrust in Scientists
Respondents were asked the extent to which they trusted
scientists. Responses were scored on a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 “completely trust” to 5 “do not trust at all”
(M  0.34, SD  0.25).
COVID-19 Related Anxiety
Respondents’ degree of specific anxiety about the COVID-19
pandemic was assessed using a single visual slider scale, ranging
from 0 “not at all anxious” on the left-hand side to 100 “extremely
anxious” on the right-hand side (M  0.61, SD  0.26).
FIGURE 1 | Distributions of belief in COVID-19 origin stories.
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Intolerance of Uncertainty
Respondents’ intolerance of uncertainty, which is thought to play a
key role in the etiology and maintenance of worry, was assessed
using the 12-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) (Buhr and
Dugas, 2002). The IUS has a good construct validity (Birrell et al.,
2011), and recent psychometric research has shown that it is best
scored as a single dimension (Shihata et al., 2018). All 12 items are
scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at all
characteristics of me” to 5 “entirely characteristic of me”. The
IUS has excellent internal consistency, good test–retest reliability
over a five-week period, and convergent and divergent validity
when assessed with symptom measures of worry, depression, and
anxiety (Buhr and Dugas, 2002) (M  0.49, SD  0.20,
alpha  0.91).
Sources of Information About COVID-19
Respondents were asked to indicate, from a list of the mainstream
newspapers, their preferred news source (either in print or online),
as a proxy measure for quality of news source and partisan news
consumption. Responses to these items were dummy coded by elite
news (M  0.38, SD  0.48), mid-level news (M  0.32, SD  0.47),
and tabloid news (M  0.27, SD  0.44). In addition, respondents
were asked the extent to which they received information about
COVID-19 from 1) family and friends (M  0.38, SD 0.32) and 2)
social media (M  0.30, SD  0.32).
Socio-Demographic Indicators
Respondents also provided their gender, age, and gross annual
household income, each of which were used for quota sampling,
as well as their highest level of education (no qualifications;
O-level/GCSE or similar; A-level or similar; diploma;




To begin, we examine the correlations among beliefs in the
respective COVID-19 origin theories. Recall, that we
hypothesized that endorsement of one origin theory will be
positively associated with belief in others (Hypothesis 1a).
Table 3 displays the Pearson’s correlations (r) between each
belief, with all estimated correlations that are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) listed in bold.
Consistent with prior research, we find that the two COVID-
19 conspiracy theories -- that the virus originated from a Wuhan
laboratory or 5G mobile networks -- are moderately positively
associated (r  0.330). However, the meat market origin theory
appears weakly negatively associated with both major conspiracy
theories (Wuhan lab, r  -0.097; r  -0.041), which is contrary to
previous findings on COVID-19 origin beliefs (e.g. Miller, 2020).
In sum, these descriptive results suggest that there is a moderately
positive association between some but not all of the COVID-19
origin theories; their content seems to matter.
Next, we turn to our test of the factors that predict belief in
various COVID-19 origin theories. If we are correct -- that
political-psychological predispositions like RWA and SDO are
important yet differential predictors of conspiracy theory
endorsement depending upon their specific content -- then we
should see different patterns for different conspiracy theories. To
this end, we regressed each COVID-19 origin theory on
political-psychological predispositions -- for example, conspiracy
ideation, RWA, and SDO -- as well as several control variables
outlined in the previous section, using ordinary least squares (OLS).2
Missing values were removed using listwise deletion.3 As such, we
present the results of three models: Model 1 (Wuhan laboratory),
Model 2 (5G network), and Model 3 (meat market).
To aid in interpretation, we present the estimated coefficients
for our main political-psychological predictors (with 95%
confidence intervals) across each conspiracy theory in
Figure 2; the full regression results are available in Table 4
(for additional model specifications relating to the 5G origin
theory, please see the Supplementary Appendix A2).4 The
dashed vertical line represents the null hypothesis (i.e., b  0);
plot points to the right of this vertical line indicate a positive
association with belief in the listed conspiracy theory; plot points
TABLE 3 | Correlations among COVID-19 origin theories.
Origin belief Meat market Wuhan lab 5G network
Meat Market — — —
Wuhan Lab −0.097 — —
5G Network −0.041 0.330 —
Note: N  1,406. Cell entries are Pearson’s correlations (r). Statistically significant
correlations printed in bold (two-tailed test, p < 0.05).
2Due to the non-normality of the 5G origin belief dependent variable, and issues of
heteroscedasticity in the residuals, we ran two supplementary tests on this belief
scale. The first involved transforming the dependent variable using the inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation and subsequently fitting an OLS regression.
The IHS transformation approximates the natural logarithm for large values of the
dependent variable, but unlike the log transformation, it can accommodate zero
values (Burbidge et al., 1988:123,126; Zhang et al., 2000:169). The IHS
transformation involves estimating a parameter (θ) using the concentrated log
likelihood (Burbidge et al., 1988), but in our application the parameter increased in
value indefinitely. Therefore, we use sinh−1(x) as a case of the IHS transformation
that retains the aforementioned benefits with regards to zero and large values, and
one which is frequently applied to long-tailed distributions (MacKinnon and
Magee, 1990:324; Williams, 2017; Bellemare and Wichman, 2020). The second
supplementary test was a Poisson regression, with a parameter added to adjust for
overdispersion (31.86), without which the standard errors may be biased. We
estimated the Poisson regression model using maximum likelihood. For both
supplementary models, the results broadly confirm those of the initial OLS model
in terms of statistical significance and effect size, with the exception of the effect of
RWA. Therefore, to allow easier comparisons across origin stories, we present the
OLS model results for 5G in the sections that follow, with any differences between
these results and the supplementary models highlighted where necessary. We
present the full results of the supplementary models in the Appendix.
3Missing values were as follows: Three missing for gender, 4 from distrust of
scientists, and 9 from the vaccination acceptance outcome. Therefore, for Models 1
to 4, N  1,399, and for Model 5, N  1,390. In short, the number of missing data is
relatively small across all models presented.
4All Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were below 2, suggesting that
multicollinearity was not an issue among the various predictors in the models.
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to the left, suggest a negative association. Statistically significant
results correspond to estimates for which the 95% confidence
intervals do not include zero (i.e., those that do not cross the
dashed vertical reference line). Finally, recall that all variables
have been scaled to range from 0 to 1, which means that while
they are not measured in the same units, they do display the
associated change in each outcome for a minimum to maximum
change in the predictors. For example, a 1-unit change in RWA is
equivalent to increasing from those who scored lowest to highest
on the 6-item Very Short Authoritarianism scale.
Looking at the results in Figure 2 (and Table 4), we can clearly
see that different conspiracy theories have different psychological
and social determinants. In other words, the pattern of coefficient
plots is not consistent across panels A, B, and C. For example,
conspiracy ideation has a relatively large and statistically
significant effect on belief in the Wuhan laboratory origin
(b  0.27, se  0.04, p < 0.001), a relatively small though still
statistically significant effect on 5G belief (b  0.07, se  0.03,
p < 0.05), and a near-zero, non-significant effect on meat market
belief (b  -0.01, se  0.04, p  0.81). Thus, we find some support
for Hypothesis 1b, but our findings suggest the content of each
origin theory conditions these effects.
Our regression results also provide support for Hypothesis 2,
as we find statistically significant effects of both RWA and SDO
on belief in the Wuhan laboratory theory (RWA: b  0.15,
se  0.05, p < 0.01; SDO: b  0.23, se  0.05, p < 0.001), the
latter of which has the second largest effect size in the model. As
expected, the effect of SDO on 5G belief is positive and relatively
large (b  0.25, se  0.04, p < 0.001), which is also substantially
larger than the effect size of conspiracy ideation as previously
noted. However, in line with our expectations, we find a negative
effect of RWA on 5G belief (b  -0.11, se  0.04, p < 0.01),5 again
reinforcing the notion that the content of each COVID-19
conspiracy theory motivates belief differently depending on an
individuals’ underlying predispositions. Once again, RWA and
SDO are not statistically significant predictors of belief in the
meat market origin theory (RWA: b  -0.06, se  0.05, p  0.26;
SDO: b  -0.02, se  0.05, p  0.66). Overall, however, our results
provide support for Hypothesis 3.
It is worth noting that a number of other psychological factors
also differentially predict belief in various COVID-19 conspiracy
theories. For instance, ethnocentrism is a statistically significant
and reasonably strong predictor of belief in all three origin
theories, which we might expect given the linkages of all origin
theories to China in some way or another. Likewise, distrust in
scientists is a statistically significant and reasonably large
predictor of Wuhan lab and 5G beliefs, but it negatively
predicts endorsement of the meat market origin theory.
COVID-19 anxiety predicts support for Wuhan lab and meat
market beliefs, but not 5G networks, while intolerance of
uncertainty only predicts support for the meat market origin
theory. Again, the effect sizes vary considerably across conspiracy
theories. News consumption has predictable associated effects:
obtaining news from family and friends increases support for
classic conspiracy theories, as does reading tabloids or other non-
elite news sources. Finally, those individuals who earn less and are
less educated are somewhat more likely to believe COVID-19
conspiracy theories, but again the size of the effect and its
statistical significance appears to be content dependent.
Before moving on to public health attitudes, we visualize the
estimated effects of our main political-psychological
predispositions across all three of the COVID-19 origin
theories in Figure 3. What is immediately apparent is that the
predicted effects on beliefs vary considerably by predisposition
and, of course, by the conspiracy theory in question.
Attitudes Toward Public Health
We conducted additional analyses seeking to understand the
potential effect of conspiracy beliefs on attitudes toward public
health policies, namely motivation to engage in social distancing
and willingness to accept a COVID-19 vaccine. To this end, we
regressed social distancing motivation on the predictor variables
from the previous models, plus the three COVID-19 origin theory
belief scales, using OLS. The results are presented in full in the
Supplementary Appendix A3. Using the same predictor
variables, we conducted a multinomial logit regression on
willingness to accept a vaccine, with the baseline set to “yes”,
also presented in full in Supplementary Appendix A3. Here, we
present the unstandardized coefficients of motivation to social
distance (with 95% confidence intervals) for visual inspection in
Figure 4, and in Figure 5 we present the marginal effects of
selected predictor variables (i.e., those that are statistically
significant or theoretically interesting) in relation to
respondents’ willingness to vaccinate, again with 95%
confidence intervals.
Closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that COVID-19
conspiracy theories do affect attitudes toward public health,
albeit in different directions. For instance, belief in the 5G
origin theory is statistically significant and negatively
associated with social distancing, accounting for a 14-point
reduction in motivation. This finding is perhaps unsurprizing,
given that a vaccine would do little to prevent the perceived
damage caused by 5G networks. By contrast, the effect of Wuhan
laboratory origin belief is positively signed, near zero, very small,
and not statistically significant. Thus, these results provide partial
support for Hypothesis 4a, in particular where belief in the 5G
theory is concerned. Belief in the meat market origin theory is
positively associated with social distancing motivations, though
the estimate is relatively small at 7-percentage points. While the
effect of general conspiracy ideation is also positive, equivalent to
a 5-percentage point increase, this predictor just falls below a
threshold for statistical significance.
Interestingly, the largest relative effects on motivations to
social distance are observed from the key political-
psychological predispositions. For example, SDO is associated
with a large and statistically significant reduction in motivation,
accounting for a 21-point decrease in social distancing. In
contrast, RWA is associated with a relatively large and
5It is worth noting that in supplementary models 3a and 3b, this finding was
statistically non-significant, and the effect size reduced (see Supplementary
Appendix A2). Therefore, this finding should be treated with more caution
than others which were replicated in the supplementary models.
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FIGURE 2 | Estimated coefficients for predictors on belief in different COVID-19 origin theories. (A) Origin theory: Wuhan lab, (B). Origin theory: 5G network, (C).
Origin theory: Meat market.
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statistically significant increase in motivation, representing a 12-
point increase in this outcome. Finally, distrust in scientists
decreases motivation (by 15 points), while age increases it (by
17 points). These results suggest that certain factors may have a
direct effect on social distancing, for instance by reducing
empathy or stimulating skepticism toward scientific advice
(Eiser et al., 2009; Bentley and Cowan, 2021).
Looking at the plotted marginal effects from the willingness to
vaccinate models (in Figure 5), we see that belief in both the 5G
and Wuhan lab conspiracy theories is associated with a
statistically significant increase in vaccine reluctance
(i.e., responding “no”). We also present the full set of relative
risk ratios and average marginal effects from these models in the
Appendix (see Supplementary Appendix A4). Political-
FIGURE 3 | Estimated coefficients for political-psychological predispositions on belief in different COVID-19 origin theories.
TABLE 4 | OLS regression results for belief in each COVID-19 origin theory.
Dependent variable
Wuhan lab 5G network Meat market
Conspiracy ideation 0.274*** (0.041) 0.065* (0.027) −0.010 (0.039)
RWA 0.145** (0.054) −0.106** (0.036) −0.059 (0.052)
SDO 0.226*** (0.052) 0.249*** (0.035) −0.022 (0.051)
Left-right scale 0.021 (0.046) 0.019 (0.031) 0.045 (0.045)
Ethnocentrism 0.117*** (0.035) 0.048* (0.024) 0.144*** (0.034)
Distrust in scientists 0.179*** (0.033) 0.199*** (0.022) −0.125*** (0.031)
COVID-19 anxiety 0.119*** (0.032) 0.022 (0.021) 0.116*** (0.031)
Intolerance of uncertainty −0.039 (0.043) 0.014 (0.029) 0.137** (0.042)
Elite news −0.014 (0.017) 0.006 (0.011) 0.019 (0.016)
Mid-level news 0.100*** (0.018) 0.004 (0.012) 0.005 (0.017)
Tabloid news 0.063*** (0.018) 0.063*** (0.012) −0.0004 (0.018)
Info: Family and friends 0.129*** (0.030) 0.086*** (0.020) −0.020 (0.029)
Info: Social media 0.074** (0.028) 0.080*** (0.019) −0.022 (0.027)
Gender 0.021 (0.016) 0.002 (0.011) −0.004 (0.016)
Age −0.037 (0.043) −0.084** (0.028) 0.056 (0.041)
Income −0.063** (0.023) −0.044** (0.015) 0.066** (0.022)
Education −0.051** (0.017) −0.015 (0.011) −0.031 (0.016)
Constant −0.175*** (0.052) 0.097** (0.034) 0.444*** (0.050)
Observations 1,399 1,399 1,399
R2 0.254 0.235 0.068
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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psychological predispositions like conspiracy ideation, RWA, and
SDO, however, do not appear to be associated with a statistically
significant direct effect on willingness to vaccinate. Belief in the meat
market theory is negatively signed but not statistically significant for
both vaccine rejection and vaccine hesitancy. Overall, we consider the
results as providing support for Hypothesis 4b. We should also note
that other factors like age, income, and COVID-19 anxiety decrease
vaccine reluctance, while distrust in scientists appears to increase it.
FIGURE 4 | Estimated coefficients for motivation to engage in social distancing.
FIGURE 5 | Marginal effects of selected predictors on willingness to take a vaccine.
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DISCUSSION
In this study we have tested hypotheses regarding the factors that
predict COVID-19 origin theories, including two that we think fit
the definition of a conspiracy theory (i.e., the virus originated in a
Chinese laboratory and the current pandemic has been caused by
5G wireless technology), as well as one plausible, yet contested
origin theory (i.e., the virus originated in a Wuhan meat market).
We also studied the implications of these conspiracy theories for
attitudes toward public health: 1) Motivation to engage in social
distancing, and 2) willingness to accept a COVID-19 vaccine. The
results of these hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 5.
Overall, our results provide support for the notion that belief
in COVID-19 conspiracy theories is associated with political-
psychological predispositions that align with the specific content
of each origin theory. Our results also highlight the negative
consequences of conspiracy theories for effective public health
interventions.
Previous research has found that there is a general disposition
to believe in conspiracy theories, which has sometimes been
referred to as a “conspiracy mentality” (Goertzel, 1994; Bruder
et al., 2013). Our findings are consistent with this literature, as we
report that a general measure of conspiracy ideation is associated
with the Wuhan lab theory albeit less so with the 5G theory. Yet,
our findings also raise some questions about the monological
belief system model of conspiracy theories, at least in the case of
COVID-19, as well as the explanatory power of conspiracy
mentality to predict subsequent behaviors (Imhoff and
Lamberty, 2020; Miller, 2020). In both of our conspiracy
theory models, the effect size of conspiracy ideation is smaller
than the findings of recent studies that also control for political
predispositions like partisanship (e.g. see Uscinski et al., 2020). Of
course, differences in effect sizes across studies could be partly
due to differences in research design, measures, and analyses’ for
example Uscinski et al. (2020) used belief that the virus was
purposefully made and spread as their outcome variable, whereas
we look at COVID-19 origin theories that may be intentional but
differ in terms of their potential plausibility and the nature of the
implied threat.
We argue, however, that it is this latter source of variation--
and the specific content of the theories themselves--that underlies
our primary contribution: Different conspiracy theories have
different psychological and social determinants. Both RWA
and SDO are strong predictors of belief in the Wuhan
laboratory conspiracy theory, while belief in the 5G conspiracy
theory is only positively associated with SDO; RWA, in fact,
decreases endorsement in 5G belief. Our findings suggest these
underlying predispositions may motivate differential beliefs
depending upon, for example, the specific threats triggered by
the content of a conspiracy theory, though we acknowledge we do
not measure this directly.
Our differential findings between RWA and COVID-19
conspiracy theories is inconsistent with previous research
suggesting a positive association between authoritarianism and
conspiracy theories, in general (Bruder et al., 2013; Richey, 2017);
however, our results are in line with more recent work that
indicates a susceptibility of those high in RWA to conspiracy
theories conforming to their worldview (Wood and Gray, 2019).
For instance, RWA has shown to be associated with pro-military
positions, and those high in RWA are particularly sensitive to
threats to both security and the social order (Pratto et al., 1994;
Doty et al., 1997; McFarland and Mathews, 2005; Terrizzi and
Drews, 2005; Crowson et al., 2006; Jackson and Gaaertner, 2010;
McFarland, 2015; Lindén et al., 2018). In this respect, a
susceptibility of those high in RWA to a specific belief in the
Wuhan lab (i.e., bioweapons) theory seems logical.
A similar case was put forward for why those high in SDO
would be specifically susceptible to the Wuhan lab theory;
however, SDO also predicted belief in the 5G conspiracy
theory. While it might seem unexpected that this preference
should be associated with conspiracy belief, previous research
has reported a similar magnitude of association to that reported
here (e.g., see Bruder et al., 2013), and recent research has
reported a moderate positive association between SDO and
belief COVID-19 that was man-made (Imhoff and Lamberty,
2020). As suggested in our theoretical discussion above, this
association may be indicative of a relationship between SDO
and anti-establishment conspiracy belief, in which conspiracy
accounts are more plausible for those that see the world as
naturally hierarchical, ruthless, and a “dog-eat-dog”
competition (De keersmaeker and Roets, 2019). Perhaps, then,
a theory in which the United Kingdom government has risked or
deliberately compromised the health of the population to get
ahead technologically, or in which the negative health effects of
TABLE 5 | Summary findings from our hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis Results
Endorsement of one COVID-19 conspiracy theory will correlate with endorsement of
another (Hypothesis 1a)
Supported
Conspiracist ideation will be positively associated with belief in COVID-19 origin
theories (Hypothesis 1b)
Supported
RWA and SDO will be positively associated with belief in the Chinese lab origin theory
(Hypothesis 2)
Supported
SDO will be positively associated with the 5G origin theory (Hypothesis 3) Supported
Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories will be negatively associated with social
distancing motivation (Hypothesis 4a)
Partially supported - belief in 5G origin theory negatively associated with social
distancing motivation, but no effect of wuhan laboratory belief
Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories will be positively associated with vaccine
rejection (Hypothesis 4b)
Supported
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5G are hidden as part of a corporate cover-up, might seem more
plausible to those high in SDO. Moreover, although this is
speculative, the present study cannot rule out the possibility
that the responses given by those high in SDO are expressive
rather than truthful responses (e.g., see Hartman and Newmark,
2012; Richey, 2017). In other words, perhaps those high in SDO
are reporting a belief in the 5G theory due to a desire to express a
related opinion that they hold, rather than because they truly
believe 5G causes COVID-19. Those high in SDO are particularly
sensitive to the economic threat of outgroups and are motivated
toward socio-economic dominance (Craig and Richeson, 2014;
Ho et al., 2015); it is therefore conceivable that those high in SDO
are expressing an attitude about the reliance on Chinese
technology during the development of the 5G network, or a
more indirect sense of threat from the economic consequences
inherent to national lockdowns. It is also possible that the link
between 5G and China is more salient to those high in SDO, and
their response here is motivated by prejudice (Duckitt, 2001; Ho
et al., 2015). Alternatively, perhaps indicating belief in
conspiracies in this context is related to a deeper desire to
spread conspiracy beliefs, which fits with Lobato et al. (2020)
findings.
Amongst our other predictors, distrust in scientists was a
strong predictor of both Wuhan laboratory and 5G belief,
consistent with previous research suggesting trust in sources is
a key motivator of subsequent behavior, but that trust in
knowledgeable experts may be undermined where they are
perceived as withholding information or possessing ulterior
motives (Eiser et al., 2009). Similarly, the influence of political
and informational factors on the perceived plausibility of
COVID-19 origin theories draws attention to the fact that
conspiracy theories are to some extent social phenomena
(Kreko, 2015). Both conspiracy theories were associated with
obtaining information about the pandemic from family and
friends and tabloid newspapers, and 5G belief was uniquely
predicted by receiving information from social media.
The more plausible meat market origin theory differed from
both of the conspiracy theories by being positively associated
with intolerance of uncertainty, which we would expect,
whereas this construct had no effect on the conspiracy
theories. This is perhaps a counterintuitive finding given
evidence of the role uncertainty plays in conspiracy belief
(e.g. van Prooijen and Jostmann, 2013). However, it is
notable that one mechanism through which uncertainty
affects conspiracy belief is through over-attentiveness to prior
judgements of the morality of conspiracy protagonists (ibid.),
which may not be a salient factor for people’s judgements of the
protagonists in our conspiracy theories, such as the 5G network.
Moreover, the effect of uncertainty in these studies was
demonstrated on conspiracies involving political and military
espionage that posed no direct threat to the participants (ibid.),
whereas we have argued the Wuhan laboratory and 5G origin
theories may motivate belief via predispositions due to an
increased sense of normative threat.
In addition to revealing general and specific influences on
theories about the origins of the COVID-19 virus, our findings
also reveal the effects of these theories on willingness to take part
in public health interventions. Our findings provide an
interesting comparison to those of recent studies that found
that belief the virus was a hoax, but not belief the virus was
man-made, reduced social distancing compliance, and that
conspiracy mentality negatively predicted compliance with
self-isolation to prevent transmission (Imhoff and Lamberty,
2020; Marinthe et al., 2020). Willingness to comply with social
distancing was positively associated with the meat market theory
but negatively with the 5G theory, despite the content of a
number of 5G conspiracy theories which implied the virus is
man-made. In addition, we find a small positive effect of
conspiracy ideation on social distancing. Rather, our findings
may suggest the more salient factor for social distancing is
whether the conspiracy implies human transmission. The lack
of effect for the Wuhan laboratory theory is congruent with this
assertion, given it still implies human transmission. Nevertheless,
these reflections on our results are largely exploratory and a
matter for further research as they provide nuance on our initial
hypothesis that conspiracy belief would be negatively associated
with social distancing. Both conspiracy theories were also
associated with skepticism about vaccines, perhaps reflecting
the fact that these theories are both strongly associated with
distrust in scientists or the established relationship between
conspiracy belief and rejection of the biomedical model
(Lamberty and Imhoff, 2018). These observations highlight the
fact that conspiracy theories are a potentially severe threat to
public health.
Our study has a number of strengths and limitations that must
be acknowledged. The main strengths were a large, representative
sample of the United Kingdom population, who had provided a
rich dataset encompassing social, demographic, psychological,
and political variables. The major limitations were that we had
measurements of only three origin theories, which means that we
differ from recent research that explicitly models belief that the
virus is a hoax (Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020),
although as noted above, for some believers in the 5G theory this
may be implied. Also, our COVID-19 origin theory measures
were observational and cross-sectional, limiting our ability to
make stronger causal inferences.
Finally, the findings we outline may be relatively bounded by
context, which potentially limits their generalizability. In the first
instance, the relationship between predispositions and conspiracy
belief, we have argued, will be partly dependent upon the sense of
threat implied by conspiracy content. But further than this,
Marinthe et al. (2020) find conspiracy mentality reduces
compliance with preventative public health behaviors primarily
when they are mandated by authorities, rather than aversion to
the behavior itself. In a similar sense, the aversion to social
distancing and vaccination we find among conspiracy theory
believers may be partly mediated by a rejection of government
mandates, as opposed to the specific behaviors perse. It is
plausible that in a context where social distancing and
vaccination are not normatively encouraged by government
that the relationship with conspiracy belief would be
suppressed, though it is unlikely to completely disappear,
given the anti-scientific themes running through many
conspiracy theories.
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Yet, we would argue an important implication of our work is the
need for public health agencies to consider conspiracy theories in
their planning and interventions that might mitigate these effects.
Despite evidence of relative stability, neither SDO nor RWA are
immutable; rather, we have argued that they are predispositions that
are sensitive to the current context, including the salience of
perceived threats to the social order and security of the ingroup
(Duckitt and Sibley, 2016:192,199; Stenner, 2005: 14–19).
Interventions will therefore need to be part of multifaceted
strategies that reflect the complexity of conspiracy theory
proliferation, as well as how they might interact with
predispositions, with interventions targeted at both the purposeful
propagators of conspiracy theories and the susceptible receivers of
misinformation. For example, Uscinksi et al. (2020) have recently
argued that if partisan cues exacerbate the propagation of conspiracy
beliefs (at least in the United States), then partisanship may also be
mobilized to provide corrective information. While we find no effect
of political orientation in our work, there are parallels in that perhaps
the group identities salient to people high in RWA and SDO can be
mobilized, for instance by having trusted sources within skeptical
communities help seed reliable information. The feasibility and
efficacy of strategies, given the strongly held prior beliefs of such
groups, remains an open question for both practitioners and
researchers.
Concerning susceptible receivers, research has demonstrated
some success in “inoculating” people against conspiracy theories,
either by being pre-warned about them or by taking part in exercises,
for example presented as computer games, in which they are asked to
generate “fake news” themselves (see van der Linden et al., 2020).
Strategies such as these may be amenable to mass dissemination, but
this would require public health agencies to include the tracking of
conspiracy theories in their pandemic planning and be ready to
intervene as widely as possible at the earliest opportunity.
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